I. INTRODUCTION 1
Public goods dilemma is abundant ranging from bacteria to high advanced animal to human 2 being [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] , which describes a situation in which several players can cooperate to achieve a public 3 good. A public good is a resource from which all may benefit, regardless of whether they have 4 helped provide the good, such as grassland, environmental resources and peace. Public goods 5 games have been widely used to model and elucidate the evolution of cooperation which is an 6 enduring evolutionary intractable problem [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] [16] [17] [18] [19] [20] . All group members are provided an identical 7 endowment (b) that can be kept or invested in a pool and simultaneously decide to cooperate 8 (invest endowment) or not (keep endowment). The key characteristic of public goods games is the 9 relationship between the level of resources contributed toward the production of the public good 10 and the level of the public good that is provided. This relationship is known as the production 11 function [21, 22] . If all members have cooperated, the group's payoff is maximized, yet to defect 12 is always better for a given player irrespective of the group's composition since the public good 13 is nonexclusive and the contribution is costly. The social dilemmas result as the best strategy for 14 players and that for a group do not coincide.
15
As in the linear public goods game, the per capita benefit is assumed to increase in a linear 16 fashion with the number of cooperators, i.e., each unit of resource contributed produces the same 17 return [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] . Some previous studies have relaxed this assumption and investigated the threshold 18 production function in which each player has a benefit if and only if the number of cooperators 19 is above a threshold, otherwise he gets nothing [14] [15] [16] . That is to say that little or no amount of 20 the public good is produced until a certain level of contributions is reached, at which point a small 21 increase in the level of contributions returns a large and discontinuous amount of the public good.
22
In various natural situations, the threshold production function, let alone the linear production 23 function, sometimes fails to capture the nature of the production of the public good. Particularly, 24 both synergy allowing per capita public good produced to increase and discounting characterizing 25 decreasing pubic good produced with increasing proportion of cooperators are prevalent from 26 pheromone trails to human architecture [23] [24] [25] [26] [27] [28] [29] [30] . The synergy can be represented by the convex 27 function, the first part of the sigmoidal function and the second part of the inverse sigmoidal function. Yet the concave function, the second part of the sigmoidal function and the first part 29 of the inverse sigmoidal function perform the discounting. In economics, the standard production 30 function is assumed as an S-shaped curve [31] , which accelerates at the beginning of production 31 and then decelerates. The initial acceleration reflects the increasing marginal returns (i.e., synergy) from each additional initial contribution, while the ensuing deceleration reflects the decreasing 33 marginal returns (i.e., discounting) when output limits are approached.
34
Besides linear and threshold production functions, concave, convex and sigmoidal production 35 functions have been investigated in evolutionary game theory [17, 18] . However all these studies 36 assume a priori that the amount of the investment takes two discrete values (i.e., all or nothing) or 37 varies continuously within a certain range. In real life, whether to contribute to the production of 38 public goods may not be either of the above two cases but rather probabilistically change according 39 to circumstances and risk orientation. Consider voting in which cooperative participants vote for 40 the proposal yielding the public good benefiting all group members and bear some costs, yet 41 defectors, on the contrary, vote against such proposal and bear no costs. However, in practice, few 42 people vote for such proposal every time they make a vote, partly due to the maxima 'don't put 43 eggs in a basket'. In addition, most of previous studies upon nonlinearity just proceed in infinitely 44 large populations [14, [17] [18] [19] [20] . Obviously, the realistic systems exhibit finiteness of populations.
45
Although there have been already attempts to study the dynamics of public goods games in finite 46 populations which assume two discrete strategies or proceed in two person games [15, 16, 35] , the adaptive dynamics of public goods games in finite populations deserve further and intensive 48 investigations.
49
In this paper, we propose a general framework how nonlinear production functions affect the 50 adaptive dynamics of the mixed strategy in finite populations where the mixed strategy is the prob-51 ability that players invest all and otherwise invest nothing. The adaptive dynamics are widely used 52 to study the long-term evolution of continuous strategy which say that the evolution on average 53 takes the population up the gradient of 'invasion fitness'. 'Invasion fitness' has frequently been 54 assumed to be the payoff of a single mutant, suggesting the population size is infinitely large 55 [19, 20, 32, 33] . Such assumption upon "invasion fitness" has been theoretically confirmed for 56 a frequency independent process [34] . In finite populations, researchers have argued that it is 57 the fixation probability rather than the payoff that carries the important information for evolution 58 [35] [36] [37] . In particular, we consider two classes of production functions consisting of concave and 59 convex curves, one with the same value of public goods produced and the other with various values 60 of public goods produced when all group members cooperate. In addition, a class of production 61 functions including sigmoidal and inverse sigmoidal curves are also considered, which produce 62 an identical public good when all group members cooperate. Note that some threshold production 63 4 functions appear in them as special cases.
64

II. MODEL
65
Consider a well-mixed population of size N, in which each individual is endowed with 1 and 66 adopts a mixed strategy x (1 ≤ x ≤ 1). The strategy x represents the probability that a player 67 cooperates, i.e., invests all his endowment 1 and the initial endowment added to his payoff is 68 0, or else he defects, i.e., invests nothing and and the initial endowment added to his payoff is 
where n is the group size and g(θ) is the production function describing the relationship between and k characterize the shape of production functions. All the above production functions, without 79 exception, are increasing and satisfy g(0) = 0, which are also followed in our model.
80
III. RESULTS
81
Following the method of the derivation in [34] (see derivation in Appendix), the first-order deterministic approximation for the mean path of x is,
is the fixation probability of a mutant with strategy y in a resident population with strategy x. Note throughout this paper ∂ ∂y y=x ρ(x; y) means that we first calculate the partial derivative of ρ(x; y) with respect to y and then replace y with x. Since C is a constant for the evolutionary process and just scales time, the adaptive dynamics can be reduced to
Substituting ρ(x; y) into Eq.1 determines the evolution of the mixed strategy over evolutionary time (see calculation in Appendix):
where
) and f (x) is the payoff of x in a monomor-82 phic population with x and is always positive in our model.
f (y, x, 1), so our conclusion qualitatively recovers the dynamics used in [19, 20, 32, 33] .
84
Clearly the evolution of the mixed strategy x is related with the global information of the 
93
At singular points, we have (see calculation in Appendix)
where .
148
• Evolution un-changes the state of the initially uniform population when the linear production 149 function is adopted and . Such result is less meaning and is no longer 150 considered in our paper. ψ w<1 similar to φ m<1 is concave, and ψ w>1 similar to φ m>1 is convex. In particular, ψ w→0 and ψ m→+∞ 162 are threshold production functions at θ = 1/n. The difference between ψ w and φ m is that ψ w<1 and 163 φ m<1 completely locate on either side of the curve ψ w=1 which can also occurs for both ψ w>1 and 164 φ m>1 when only the values of ψ m (θ) at θ = 0, 1/n, · · · , 1 are considered. Additionally, the value of 165 8 the public goods provided when all group members cooperate (i.e., θ = 1) is variable for all ψ w (θ)
166
but is fixed for all φ m (θ).
167
Substituting ψ w (θ) into Eq.2 determines the adaptive dynamics,
The above five evolutionary scenarios for φ m also occur for ψ w . However, the parameter ranges We have investigated the adaptive dynamics of the mixed strategy under convex and concave 183 production functions which are segments of the standard S-shaped production functions. How-184 ever, the adaptive dynamics under the convex and concave production functions can't predict 185 that of sigmoidal production functions since the adaptive dynamics are related with the whole 186 shape of the production function. Following we will consider sigmoidal as well as inverse sig-187 moid production functions for generality which may lead to more than one singular strategy since 
Here, the adaptive dynamics yield at most two singular 194 strategies 0 < x 1 < 1/2 < x 2 < 1, where x 1 is a repeller (or a CESS) and x 2 is a CESS (or a 195 repeller) (see analysis in Appendix). In principle, sigmoidal or inverse sigmoidal production func- of such singular strategy and perform just as the system yields no singular strategies.
201
Consider a third series of production functions ϕ s (θ) whose shape is characterized by the parameter s > −0.5 in figure 4a
which is also 203 symmetrically sigmoid and is adopted in [18] . In the case of − ( Fig.4b-d) . . Such complex dynamics only 266 appear in multi-player games not possible for two-player games similar to [14] . In particular, co-267 operation is doomed when the group size is equal to the population size irrespective of production 268 functions, similar to the evolution of two pure strategies in finite populations [15, 16] .
269
The adaptive dynamics of the mixed strategy are related with the whole shape of the production 
292
We found the hysteresis effect in all these three classes of production functions, where the is reached, which is the opposite for the parameter range producing a 306 unique repeller. 
for θ = 0, g(θ) = 3.5 for 0 < θ ≤ 1, (e) g(θ) = 0 for θ = 0, g(θ) = 1.75 for 0 < θ < 0.5 and g(θ) = 3.5 409 for θ = 1, (f) g(θ) = 0 for 0 ≤ θ < 0.5, g(θ) = 1.75 for θ = 0.5 and g(θ) = 3.5 for 0.5 < θ ≤ 1. 
is the production function, describing the relationship between the proportion of cooperators in a group 
450
The principle of mutual exclusion says that two adaptive strategies cannot coexist indefinitely in the population when not renewed by mutations. We assume that the mutation rate u is sufficiently small so that the mutant strategy or the resident strategy reaches fixation before a new mutant occurs. In the long term, there is only a single strategy prevailing in the population at almost any point in time and the evolutionary process can be envisaged a sequence of strategy substitutions. Let p(x, t) be the probability that the strategy in the population is x at the time t. By virtue of the Markov property,
where w(y, x) is the transition probability per unit time for the strategy substitution x → y. Since mutation 
453
The mean path of the strategy substitutions is denoted by x (t) and defined as
Neglecting the order of integration and differential, we can obtain the dynamics of the mean path from
where a 1 (x) = (y − x)w(y, x)dy. On the condition that the derivations of the stochastic realizations from the mean path are relatively small which means that the variance of the mutation process is sufficient small, the above equation can be approximated as
Using the first-order approximation of the fixation probability and the symmetry of the mutation, we obtain the dynamics of the mean path d dt
where C 0 is a constant which reflects the populations size and the mutation process. Using the third-order approximation of the fixation probability, we obtain the dynamics of the mean path
where C 1 and C 2 are constants which reflect the populations size and the mutation process. Note the bracket 454 denoting the mean will ceased using for simplicity in main texts.
455
• If G ′ (x) ≥ 0 holds for all x ∈ (x * 1 , x * 2 ), G(x * 2 ) > G(x * 1 ) = 0 contradicts with the singularity of x * 2 .
• If there exists x ∈ (x * 1 , x * 2 ) satisfying G ′ (x) < 0, then one of the following three possible cases occurs, The expression of
2 holds for even n or k = n−1 2 holds for odd n.
493
• Symmetrically sigmoidal g(θ) is convex in [0, 1/2) and concave in [1/2, 1] satisfying, ∀θ 1 , θ 2 ≤ 1/2,
and D(x) < 0 for x ∈ (1/2, 1]. There exist at almost two singular strategies 0
where x 1 is a repeller and x 2 is a CESS.
497
• Symmetrically inverse sigmoidal g(θ) is concave in [0, 1/2) and convex in [1/2, 1] satisfying,
There exist almost two singular strate-500 gies 0 ≤ x 1 < 1/2 < x 2 ≤ 1, where x 1 is a CESS and x 2 is a repeller. 
528
The population of size N is initialized with a homogeneous state. We asynchronously update the pop- 
